July 1996 Information Security '96 Page 1
INFORMATION WARFARE:
Where are the Threats?
by
Dr. H.B. Wolfe
``Emerge from the void, strike vulnerable points, shun places that are defended,
attack in unexpected quarters.'' Sun Tzu 5th Century BC The Art of War
New Virus Opportunities Macro Viruses
The computer virus phenomenon has not disappeared. It may not be gathering the media
hype of years past but it is still a very real threat to computing. In addition, new types of
viruses have appeared and the advent of Windows '95 has provided a new challenge to
virus writers.
By now most of us are familiar with the original two types of infection formerly
encountered. The boot sector and applications sector viruses have not gone away. The
method of their general operation remains the same. However, these basic techniques
have been improved with the introduction of companion, multipartite, polymorphic, and
stealth viruses (for both boot sector and applications) to name a few.
The new approaches have come in the form of macro viruses. These have the unique
ability to spread attached to DOCUMENT files. This is a major departure from the good
old viruses we have come to expect and loathe. We have discussed in the past how such a
virus might work but up until that last few months they were only found in the laboratory
and not in the ``wild''.
Enter the Word ``Concept'' virus. While the DMV was developed earlier, the Concept is
the first to be found traveling in cyberspace. Although it does have a payload, that
payload is never executed. The Word macro viruses make use of the fact that Microsoft
Word uses templates to set up documents. These templates can contain executable
instructions macros. The most common one that we usually see is identified as
NORMAL.DOT Word's global document template. This sets up your page margins and
type fonts, etc. Some macro viruses modify this specific Word template in such a way as
to be able to execute their code. That code is added to every new document file created
thereafter with the Save As command.
One of the important features of this generic type of virus is the fact that it can travel
between different environments. The Word macro virus can infect across platforms (no
other virus family has that capacity so far). What that means is that it can work in the
Windows environment in versions 3.x, '95, and NT as well as in Word 6.x for Macintosh.
This constitutes a major milestone in the development cycle of virus technology.
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
Page 2 Information Security '96 July 1996
In the short term, you can protect your system from most macro viruses (but NOT all) by
creating a new macro called AutoExec. The commands necessary are as follows:
Sub MAIN
End Sub
DisableAutoMacros
MsgBox ``AutoMacros are now turned off.'', ``Virus protection'', 64
The newer versions of antivirus products will scan for these types of viruses as well.
New Operating Systems New Virus Challenges
Microsoft, in its infinite wisdom, has introduced a new operating system Windows '95.
This offers new challenges to the budding virus writer. Those challenges have not gone
unnoticed. The first recorded Windows '95 operating system specific virus is called the
Boza.A also know n as Bizatch. This was first discovered in January and is of Australian
origin. This first version was written just to demonstrate that Windows '95 was
vulnerable and is actually designed to do no harm. However, it has a bug that in some
cases will cause infected .EXE files to increase in size by several megabytes. This is just
the beginning of a whole new family of viruses.
The Boza.A infects Windows Portable Executable .EXE files. One to three files are
infected each time that the Boza.A is executed. It was created by VLAD a virus writers
group originating in Australia. This group also have made available much in the way of
virus source code on the Intemet. Once again, most of the newer versions of antivirus
products will scan for this virus and repair files infected by it.
It is worth mentioning that there are several Word Trojans that are currently circulating.
These do not replicate themselves, however, if you should be unfortunate enough to open
a document that has one of these attached, it will immediately begin deleting data.
Guarding Against Viruses The Best Defenses
The best defenses against viruses still apply. A good scanner should always be used on
new files and now not just executables only but also document files capable of carrying
macro code with them. John McAfee's SCAN or Frid Skulason's FPROT can easily be
downloaded from the Intemet at no cost and are among the best available today. In
addition there are several excellent products currently available in the marketplace that
have survived the test of time.
We all need to be reminded that the best defensive technique is backing up all of your
important files regularly. With proper backup we can recover from most kinds of attacks.
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
July 1996 Information Security '96 Page 3
Use of Encryption Why, When and How
Data encryption is a powerful tool that can provide privacy and confidentiality in the
storage of data and in the communication of data. If you ascribe to the philosophy that
privacy is one of the basic human rights that everyone is or should be entitled to then
cryptography provides one of the tools to enable us all to carry out that right. If your
philosophy is that law enforcement and governments should have the ability to deprive
citizens of that right by being able to view or intercept and view private data and
communications at their discretion then cryptography is what is used by criminals to
thwart that ability. The notion of ``if you have nothing to hide then you shouldn't mind''
is a naive and foolish. In every society where this authority has been granted it has been
abused to the detriment of its citizenry.
Who is ``right'' is really a matter of emotion and opinion and I suppose power. If citizens
knowingly entrust the servants of the people with the authority to intercept, eavesdrop and
intrude into private communications, papers and affairs then they have the power. If law
enforcement and/or government usurp that authority without the knowledge of the
citizens then George Orwell's prediction in 1984 has come true.
In any environment, business or private, there are pieces of information that are
confidential that need to be stored and/or communicated. The risk as a result of that
information falling into the wrong hands has varying degrees of severity. It may be
proprietary information that would put a competitor at an advantage if known to them. It
may be information controlling capital or the movement of capital. Once again if that
information were known then actions could be taken to intercept or divert the capital.
Therefore, we use encryption to protect sensitive communications and confidential data
storage.
The tools to accomplish this come in many flavors. To the untrained or unknowledgeable
one encryption product (algorithm) might seem as secure as the next but that couldn't be
further from the truth. For example WordPerfect has a data encryption function. Many
unsuspecting folks use it believing that they are successfully protecting their stored
documents. Any hacker knows that a program called WPCRACK is freely available on
the Internet. This program derives the key phrase from the encrypted file thus enabling
anyone who has WPCRACK to decode a WordPerfect encrypted file without initially
knowing the key phrase. A similar cracker program is also available for Microsoft Word.
The lesson to be learned is that simply because a vendor has a reputation for excellence in
one arena does not automatically mean that they also possess that same level of expertise
in another. The example cited above could have easily been avoided by calling upon a
cryptographer of stature for advice in selecting the encryption algorithm and in its use. It
is important to understand that an algorithm of superior strength can be weakened or
undermined in that strength by poor or illconceived usage.
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any formor by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
Page 4 Information Security '96 July 1996
Some History
Modern cryptography really came into its own in the mid 1970's. In 1975 the U.S.
Government invited proposals for a data encryption standard that could be certified to
provide a given level of protection. One of the algorithms submitted was called Lucifer
(devised by IBM). It was a block cipher with a key length of 128 bits (this attribute is
often confused as the ONLY gauge by which the relative strength of an algorithm can be
judged). The National Security Agency (NSA) is the code making and code breaking
agency for the U.S. It is the largest single user of computers, and largest single employer
of mathematicians and cryptographers in the world. They had a great deal of influence in
the creation of the final algorithm today known as the DES (Data Encryption Standard).
This algorithm is one of the most commonly used encryption algorithms in use in
business today.
The final DES consisted of a symmetric block cipher with a 56 bit key. The 56 bits can be
described as follows: the total number of possible permutations of any given message
encrypted using the DES algorithm is 2 56 . That's a lot of different messages considering
that only one of those is the real one. At the time of its creation it was estimated that with
all of the available computing power in the world it would take hundreds of years to find
the key. Things have changed since then, It is currently estimated that NSA can decrypt
such a message in a few minutes or less with the equipment that they have available.
The DES has been shrouded in controversy ever since its certification. NSA has been
accused of designing a ``back door'' into the algorithm. It has also been accused of
deliberately diminishing the DES's level of security by reducing the possible number of
permutations (56 bit key instead of the 128 bit key in the original Lucifer design). Of
course all of these allegations have been denied, however, this introduces politics into the
equation of privacy.
The Politics of Encryption
War has caught us that knowing what the enemy intends to do gives us an advantage.
WW II was influenced dramatically by cryptography some say that it determined the
outcome. The Allies were, from the very beginning and throughout the war, able to
decode the communications of both the Axis powers and the Japanese. The United States
has considered data encryption and its tools the domain of the intelligence community and
has legislated that (under the ITAR regulations) cryptographic hardware and software fall
into the classification of munitions. As such they strictly regulate the export of items that
fall into that category. Moreover, there is a strong conviction on the part of the U.S.
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. BOX 6079, Dunedin New Zealand.No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
July 1996 Information Security '96 Page 5
Government and law enforcement that they and only they should have the right and
authority to be able to decode any and all communications. The rationale apparently is
that without that ability law enforcement cannot deal with crime prevention effectively.
The intelligence community rationalize it by using the ``threats to national security''
argument for their justification. Since both sectors wield significant influence and power,
a new concept in cryptography has emerged. It's called escrow encryption. The U.S.
Government is actively pursuing the notion that no one should be allowed to have strong
encryption (meaning that they can't break it) and should ``trust them'' not to abuse their
power. This from a government with a chronic history of the abuse of power.
Addressing what the U.S. does may not seem particularly relevant to what we do in New
Zealand or the rest of the world but that couldn't be further from fact. The U.S. is
currently in the process of attempting to hijack the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on
Cryptography Policy Guidelines a subcommittee of the Committee for Information,
Computer and Communications Policy specifically set up by the OECD to establish
cryptographic standards amongst OECD nations (New Zealand is a member). When I say
hijack, I mean load the subcommittee with like minded individuals so that their (the
US's) agenda can be carried out. It is the position of the U.S that only law enforcement
and intelligence professionals should be members of this committee and that strong
cryptography should only be available to those two groups. Of course with no input from
other sectors strong encryption for the masses will ultimately be outlawed. That means us.
Escrow Encryption
The current initiative in escrow encryption is generally referred to as Clipper, however,
that is really only the name given to one of the chips in which the escrow algorithm called
Skipjack is implemented. Its computer counterpart is the Capstone algorithm
implemented in the Fortezza chip. The way it works is that encryption between parties is
carried out in the normal way, however, lodged with two escrow agents (both are arms of
the U.S. Government) is the escrow key or more precisely each escrow agent possesses
one half of the key. If government or law enforcement decided that they wanted to have
access to your communications or encrypted files, they would, theoretically, obtain a
court order and take it to the escrow agents to obtain the two halves of your key and
proceed to decode your communications or files. The escrow key (or ``family'' key) is a
secondary key that unlocks the algorithm to them. However, the algorithm is secret. The
exact details of the production of ``family'' keys is secret. All ``family'' keys will be
produced by NSA. Of course, THEY wouldNEVER retain any of those ``family'' keys for
future use. Moreover, the actual number of unique ``family'' keys is unknown. If the
system were used by nations other than the U.S. these facts would remain the same.
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
Page 6 Information Security '96 July 1996
For the reader that assumes that law enforcement or government should be able to view
any and all communications that everyone might engage in, this type of encryption
presents no problems. For those of us who believe strongly that privacy is one of our
most basic human rights, this presents a big problem. One of the attitudes that I have
noticed during the seventeen years that I have lived in New Zealand is that most folks
seem to believe that anything that is secret is bad and/or illegal. For the reader who
ascribes to that view, I direct your attention to the book by Sissela Bok called SECRETS:
Concealment & Revelation. It is an excellent exposition of why each and every one of us
needs privacy andsecrecy in our day to day lives and dispels the notion that it is
automatically bad or in some way illegal.
Newer Algorithms
Concurrently, from the time that the DES was certified by the U.S. Government,
cryptographers in the public sector have engaged in continuous development. Several
notable approaches have emerged, been tested and continue to provide strong encryption.
There are a couple of symmetric block ciphers of note. The first is the 128 bit IDEA
(International Data Encryption Algorithm) developed around 1990 by Xuejia Lai and
James Massey. This is thought to be one of the most secure today. To give you an idea of
exactly what that means: if you had a computer capable of doing one billion encryptions
per second AND you could array one billion of these machines to work in concert, a
bruteforce attack, on a single message encrypted using IDEA, would take 10 13 years to
find the solution. By anyone's standards that's a long time. In cryptographic terms it is
considered computationally secure. The interesting thing about IDEA is that it is not
owned or controlled by the U.S. and can be licensed through Ascom Systec, Ltd., a Swiss
company.
The second is a variable key length (up to 448 bits) block cipher, called Blowfish,
developed in the last couple of years by Bruce Schneier. It's pretty new and has been
scrutinized but thus far no one has been able to defeat it.
Another that is currently being used is called Triple DES. This uses the DES algorithm
but does the encryption in three passes. Using two different keys. This improves the
apparent security of the DES to 112 bits or 2 to the 112 power different possible
permutations of any single message.
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
July 1996 Information Security '96 Page 7
Public Key CryptoSystems
In the late seventies another approach was developed called public key cryptography.
Instead of having only one key to perform the functions of encryption and decryption
public key systems require two keys. One with which you encrypt and another with which
you decrypt.
The weakest point in the use of cryptography is the exchange of keys. If keys can be
intercepted, then there is no need to attempt to ``break'' an encoded message. Asymmetric
key ciphers eliminate the need to exchange secret keys. This is a very attractive feature
because it allows strangers to communicate immediately in a secure way. To put it into
terms that are readily understandable: two organizations can do business, that is, exchange
confidential or financial information with the expectation that no one else can view and
interpret that information. This can include the simple ordering of goods using a credit
card number over the Intemet with the confidence that no one along the path of your
communication can interpret the encoded portion of your order that contains your credit
card number. NOTE: Communication on the Internet requires that any given message be
passed through several intermediaries before it ultimately reaches its destination. At ANY
point along that path the message can be recorded, viewed or misdirected at the discretion
of the operator at that node.
There are a few such systems that have emerged as being stable and secure. The first to
receive attention is the RSA algorithm developed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len
Adleman. They issued a challenge in August 1977 to decrypt a message encoded with a
429 bit key. They predicted that it would take 40 quadrillion years with the technology of
the day to crack the code. In April 1994 after eight months of effort using 1600 computers
the message was solved.
You may have noticed earlier in the paper that I have described the computational
security of IDEA and it only had a 128 bit key as compared to the 429 bit key cited above.
It is important to understand the difference in approach between a symmetric block cipher
and a public key cipher. Solving the public key cipher does not depend on a bruteforce
attack strategy. In the case of the RSA algorithm the two keys are based on very large
prime numbers. The attack strategy is to factor these prime numbers and then derive a
solution. The symmetric block cipher does not depend on large prime numbers for any
part of its activity and therefore this attack strategy does not work with them. A simple
guide to comparative levels of computational security is as follows:
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
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Page 8 Information Security '96 July 1996
Symmetric Public Key
56 is equivalent to 384 size of
112 is equivalent to 1792 keys in
128 is equivalent to 2304 bits
What is to be learned by the solving of the RSA429 message is that the RSA algorithm
must be used with large key sizes 512 bit keys or larger preferably 1024 or greater in
order to provide strong protection.
Another public key system is Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). It was developed and
introduced by Phil Zimmermann in 1991 and has become the world de facto standard for
ordinary citizens of all nations. This is a hybrid system which incorporates three different
algorithms to provide sufficient computational security for the common man. These
include RSA (used to protect the randomly generated keys used with IDEA to encrypt the
main body of the message), IDEA (used to encrypt the main body of the message) and
MD5 (a one way hash function developed by Ron Rivest and used in this incarnation to
create an authentication signature for the message). PGP has become freely available from
Internet sites around the world. In your search for potential archival sites ignore the U.S.
(refer to the references at the end of this paper for some likely starting points). If you're
outside the U.S. and try to download a copy from MIT, for example, that download will
be stopped and in fact constitutes an offense under U.S. law. There are also Windows
front ends to drive PGP that make it a little more user friendly as well.
Unfortunately for Phil, the U.S. Govermnent has viewed PGP's proliferation very
negatively. In fact the FBI and other agencies have investigated Phil with the intention of
prosecuting him for the export of string encryption to destinations outside the U.S.
without the required export approvals. They have spent the past four years on that
investigation and in January of this year decided not to proceed. During that time Phil has
had to put up with a lot of Government harassment. In fact, we were returning to the U.S.
from Curacao in 1994 through Miami after speaking at a conference. I proceeded through
Customs with no problem it took 5 minutes. Eight hours later Phil emerged somewhat
bedraggled to continue his trip home. Of course he'd missed his flight by then.
New Zealand has a community of interest in cryptography. There are at least two public
key systems that have been developed here in New Zealand. The LUC system was
developed by Peter Smith of Auckland. It makes use of Lucas functions in the generation
of primes. It's too new to determine how secure the algorithm is at this point. There is
some talk of an unpublished paper describing how to break at least some implementations
of it. Another is RPK developed by Bill Raike of Auckland. Dr. Raike's system is based
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
July 1996 Information security '96 Page 9
upon the mathematics of finite Galois fields. Once again it is too new to be certain of its
real level of computational security but it does show promise.
Another firm in Christchurch (CES) has developed an analog stream cipher and
implemented it in hardware form (called SignalGuard). It does not consider data in any
way. It transforms the analog signal once it has left the modem for transmission over a
telephone line. This is a unique approach to encryption and offers a level of security
which is at this time unknown to the writer.
There are products that we can purchase here in spite of the U.S. ban on the export of
strong encryption. For example, Fujitzu distributes a product called TeamWARE Crypto
that makes use of the FEAL8 algorithm (NZ$215). It runs in the Windows (3.x and `95)
environment and is nonintrusive and pretty easy to use. This type of product is ideal for
protecting sensitive data stored on portable computers. It is important to note that trends
in crime seem to favor the theft of portable computers (more than 200,000 were stolen in
the U.S. in 1995). In fact there are documented cases of the targeting of specific
executives and the theft of their machines not for the hardware but what is contained
thereon. Any business person that routinely uses their notebook computer to store
sensitive business information should be using such a product.
PGPfone, Nautilus
There is another use for encryption. That is in voice communication. There are a few
micro based systems that are currently available on the Internet that facilitate secure
communications. Two such systems are Nautilus and PGPfone. Both require multimedia
machines in the Pentium range with high speed modems and sound cards. Nautilus makes
IDEA, Triple Des or Blowfish available for the user's choice of encryption algorithms.
PGPfone offers Triple Des or Blowfish and is available for both Mackintosh and
Windows `95 environments. Both systems make it possible for two people with
multimedia computers to communicate securely over the phone. In the past only
diplomats and governments had that capability. Once again, real privacy has been made
possible for the ordinary citizen through the use of cryptography.
Other unseen threats TEMPEST
It is easy for those of us who are technology oriented to be drawn into obscure and
unlikely security threats merely because of the interesting technology involved. TEMPEST
is such an area of interest. The average computer user can dismiss the risk attributed to
TEMPEST surveillance and so justify that opinion by saying that only governments have
the necessary technology to carry out such data interception. On the surface that makes a
pretty good argument. However, upon closer inspection we find that devices to intercept
such electronic emanations are freely available for a price. Such devices can be purchased
(without license or other control) freely for prices ranging from US$2995 to as much as
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
Page 10 Information Security '96 July 1996
US$29,995. Moreover, with plans for such a device it can be built by an electronics
hobbyist for just a few hundred New Zealand dollars. This is not an academic
pronouncement nor idle conjecture. Two students in my Computer Security class have
done so from plans which I obtained for US$50 and it works.
As the value of information increases and as more folks become aware that information
can be obtained with minimal risk by using TEMPEST techniques its use will surely rise.
Without legislation to inhibit the use of that technique and without technology freely
available to thwart and defend against TEMPEST attacks there is no reason NOT to make
use of this technology.
Closing Comments
We live in the age of information and technology. Each and every day of our lives is
touched in some way by one or the other. In order to protect ourselves from the many
risks associated with both it is incumbent on us all to learn all that we can and use that
knowledge to defend that which is most precious to us (``knowledge is power''). The key
to computer security is people. The key to good computer security is people that strive to
learn all they can about their field and apply that knowledge in a responsible way to
protecting the integrity, accuracy and continuity of their information technology.
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
July 1996 Information Security '96 Page 11
Additional Sources of Useful Information:
Cryptography:
Schneier, Bruce, Applied Cryptography, 2nd Edition, New York, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1996, ISBN 0471117099.
Schneier, Bruce, EMAIL SECURITY: How to Keep Your Electronic Messages
Private, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995, ISBN 047105318X.
Stallings, William, PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY: A Guide for PGP Users,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall PTR, 1995, ISBN 0131855964.
Bamford, James, The Puzzle Palace, Harmondworth, England, Penguin, Books,
Ltd., 1983, ISBN 0140067485.
Kahn, David, THE CODEBREAKERS: The Story of Secret Writing, New York,
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1967, ISBN 0025604600.
Viruses:
Ludwig, Mark, The Giant Black Book of Computer Viruses, Show Low, Arizona,
American Eagle Publications, Inc., 1995, ISBN 0929408101.
Networks:
Cheswick, William R., Bellovin, Steven M., Firewalls and Internet Security,
Reading Massachusetts, AddisonWesley Publications Company, 1994,
ISBN 0201633574.
Document Security:
van Renesse, Rudolf L., Optical Document Security, Norwood, Massachusetts,
Artech House, Inc. 1994, ISBN 0890066191.
General:
Schwartau, Winn, INFORMATION WARFARE: Chaos on the Electronic
Superhighway, New York, Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994, ISBN 1560250801.
Bok, Sissela, SECRETS: Concealment & Revelation, Oxford, England, Oxford
University Press, 1986, ISBN 0192860720.
Periodicals:
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
Page 12 Information Security '96 July 1996
Computers & Security, Oxford, England, Elsevier Advanced Technology, 8 issues
per year, ISSN 01674048.
Computer Fraud & Security Bulletin, Oxford, England, Elsevier Advanced
Technology, 12 issues per year, ISSN 13613723.
Network Security, Oxford, England, Elsevier Advanced Technology, 12 issues per
year, ISSN 13534858.
INFO Security News, Framingham, Massachusetts, MIS Training Institute Press,
Inc. 6 issues per year, ISSN 10667822.
Cryptologia, Terre Haute, Indiana, RoseHulman Institute of Technology, 4 issues
per year, ISSN 01611194.
Privacy and Security 2001, Sterling, Virginia, Ross Engineering, Inc., 12 issues
per year.
© 1996 H.B. Wolfe, P.O. Box 6079, Dunedin New Zealand. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, optical, or magnetic, without prior written permission of
the author.
